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INTRODUCTORY ARTICLE

Disquiet on the Home Front:
'LVWXUELQJ&ULVHVLQWKH1DWLRQ·V
Markets and Institutions
Shelby D. Green
Crises are everywhere³in the housing market, in the
financial markets and in the courts. It is difficult to exaggerate
how large these crises are. It began with housing, but the
effects dominoed throughout the economy. Consumer wealth
evaporated. Developers watched rents fall and financing costs
rise. Businesses contracted or dissolved. Exports plunged.
Indeed, the Director of National Intelligence recently declared
that the greatest threat to our national security is economic
instability.1 The main line of defense against recession³the
Federal Reserve³seems to be at wits end.2 All the usual
responses have been tried and have failed: the federal interest
rate has been cut to nearly zero and billions of dollars in loans
continue to be pumped into the economy.3 Even the drastic

Associate Professor of Law and Director, LL.M. Program in Real Estate
Law, Pace University School of Law. J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center, B.S., Towson State College. This Article will introduce the topics
discussed in this edition of the PACE LAW REVIEW from the symposium, Real
Property, Mortgages, and the Economy: A Call for Ethics and Reforms,
presented jointly by the PACE LAW REVIEW and the Pace University School of
Law, L.L.M. Program in Real Estate Law.
1. Stephen Manning, Experts: Financial Crisis Threatens U.S. Security,
ABCNEWS.COM,
Mar.
11,
2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=7056044.
2. See Louis Uchitelle, Wall Street Questioning if Bernanke is Tough
Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at C1.
3. Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve, Address at the Women in
Housing and Finance and Exchequer Club Joint Luncheon: Financial
Markets, the Economic Outlook, and Monetary Policy (Jan. 10, 2008).
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bailout plan,4 involving the appropriation of $700 billion to buy
troubled assets or preferred stock in troubled banks, has not
sparked the economy. While almost too much has been written
DERXW RXU QDWLRQ·V FXUUHQW HFRQRPLF ZRes, some recurring
themes have emerged.
I. Crisis in the Housing Markets
A long-standing and laudable national goal has been to
increase home ownership in the United States to its maximum
possible level, which should thus lead to an accumulation of
wealth and security throughout the nation.5 This goal has
served as the outward premise for various national programs
and policies.6 In fact, in 2003, home ownership reached a
historic peak of just under seventy percent of all households.7
This was a significant increase over the forty-four percent rate
in 1934, when the first federal program was established to
realize this goal.8 Some critics, however, have asserted that
4. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
5. See Paul Krugman, Home Not-So-Sweet Home, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
2008, at A21.
6. The list of these national programs is indeed extensive, however
particularly prominent features include the deductibility from taxable income
of mortgage interest, see 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3)(A)(i) (2006), and the creation of
WKH)HGHUDO+RXVLQJ$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ ´)+$µ WRSURYLGHLQVXUDQFHWROHQGHUV
and to permit leveraging of ninety-seven percent on FHA loans, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1709(b)(9)(A) (2006) (requiring homeowners to make a 3.5% down
payment). See also The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-128, § 801, 91 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.);; OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP·T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., U.S. HOUSING MARKET CONDITIONS: 3D QUARTER 1 (2006), available at
www.huduser.org/periodicals/ushmc/fall06/Q306_summary.pdf;; Vernon L.
Smith, The Clinton Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007, at A20
(mocking various governmental policies, including reduced capital gains tax
rate, funding mortgages by federally-chartered agencies, and short-sighted
federal reserve policies as causing the housing bubble now exploding);; infra
note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the implicit Federal Government
guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
7. See Dean Baker, Subprime Borrowers Deserve an Own to Rent
Transition, ECONOMISTS· VOICE, Feb. 2008, at 2, available at
KWWSZZZEHSUHVVFRPHYYROLVVDUW IROORZ ´'RZQORDGµ   See also
OFFICE OF FED. HOUSING ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT ´2)+(2µ  REPORT TO
CONGRESS
5
(2008),
available
at
www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2097/OFHEOReporttoCongress2008.pdf.
8. See U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Census of Housing Tables,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html
(last
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these national policies, particularly the deductibility of
mortgage interest and government insurance of mortgage
loans, have distorted the markets and subsidized risk-taking
by encouraging borrowers to increase their mortgage leverage
and lenders to decrease their caution.9 The immediate result
was a rising housing market.10 ´From 1995 to 2006, house
prices rose by almost eighty percent after adjusting for
LQIODWLRQµ11 compared to the century from 1895 to 1995, when
house prices rose at almost the same rate as inflation.12 The
bubble-inflated prices of recent years facilitated a level of
construction that was far greater than what the ranks of

visited Oct. 28, 2009);; infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
9. See Posting of Edward L. Glaeser, Killing (or Maiming) a Sacred Cow:
Home
Mortgage
Deductions,
Economix,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/killing-or-maiming-a-sacred-
cow-home-mortgage-deductions/ (Feb. 24, 2009, 07:40 EST). See also Steven
A. Holmes, Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1999, at C2. Lenders used the national goal of homeownership
cynically, or perhaps in an act of self-deception, as they relied heedlessly on
models instead of the actual circumstances of the borrower and the world in
lending. NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY 268-69 (2008). The model
allowed them to relax underwriting standards (including foregoing
documentation of assets and income, as well as high leveraging) partly
because of the real property collateral and the recognition that low-income
borrowers often had undocumented income. Id. at 269. Lenders could
minimize the increased risks by raising interest rates and shifting the risk of
inflation through adjustable rate mortgages.
Id. at 264-65.
Most
significantly, lenders could pass on most of the risks through a sale of the
mortgages in pools on the secondary market. Id. at 268-69. The secondary
mortgage market is a market where existing mortgages are bought and sold.
See Daniel J. McDonald & Daniel L. Thornton, A Primer on the Mortgage
Market and Mortgage Finance, 90 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV.
(PART I) 31, 31-45 (2008). At first, two privately owned, yet government-
sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, issued debt and used the
proceeds to purchase mortgages in the secondary market. See generally
Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market: A Catalyst For Change
in Real Estate Transactions, 39 S.W. L.J. 991 (1986). In recent years, private
investment entities have also entered the secondary market. See SHARON L.
STARK & BARBARA F. BUCKLEY, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MONTHLY
MONITOR
6
(July
2008),
available
at
MARKET
http://files.ots.treas.gov/131013.pdf.
10. See Glaeser, supra note 9.
11. Baker, supra note 7, at 1. Indeed, in 2001, the average price of a
home exceeded all the highest prices. See OFHEO, supra note 7, at 3. In
2006, the average price was nearly twice the average price less than ten
years earlier. See id. at 5.
12. Baker, supra note 7, at 1.
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prospective home-buyers could absorb.13
High leveraging by poor credit risks in real estate markets,
however, promoted instability in both the housing and financial
markets.14 These highly-leveraged homeowners could not
13. See David Brooks, The Bailout Artists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at
A23.
14. These highly-leveraged borrowers make up in large measure what is
UHIHUUHG WR DV WKH ´VXESULPH PDUNHWµ  ,W LV SULPDULO\ FKDUDFWHUL]HG DV
consisting of borrowers with relatively low credit scores (620 compared to the
medium score in the country of 723). Characteristics of Subprime Lending
Market Generally, Subprime Lending: An Update of the Issues and
Approaches (MB) § 2, at 3-4 (2007). These borrowers also borrow on a loan-
to-value ratio greater than eighty percent. Id. As such, they posed the
greatest risk, with their great prospect of being unable to carry their debt. To
minimize some of this risk, these loans involve a balloon payment of
principal, and are often coupled with negative amortization that adds accrued
but unpaid interest to the debt. This means that the principal is not being
reduced on a regular basis. These borrowers are enticed into these loans by
the promise of the possibility of repayment on sale or refinancing at a higher
price. The most common type of subprime mortgage, the so-called 2/28 loans,
start out at below-PDUNHW ´WHDVHUµ UDWHs fixed for two years, and are then
adjusted in accordance with some index for the remaining twenty-eight year
term. Once the teaser period expired, many borrowers were unable to carry
the adjustable interest payments when overall interest rate levels did not
remain low. With the decline in housing prices, these borrowers were unable
to refinance their unwise loans. There is approximately $1.3 trillion of
subprime mortgage debt outstanding, and approximately twenty percent of
current, outstanding home mortgages are subprime. See Amy Crews Cutts,
Deputy Chief Economist, Freddie Mac, Address at the Mortgage Bankers
Association, 2008 Document Custody Conference (Sept. 22, 2008), available
at
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Conferences/2008/DocumentManageme
ntandCustodyConf08/DMC08SEPT25AmyCuttsMarketUpdate.pdf.
The
great bulk of the subprime loans were borrowed in 2005 and 2006, at the
height of the housing boom. Id. Almost two-thirds of these loans have been
packaged into mortgage-backed securities. See ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & TIL
SCHUERMANN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORTS: UNDERSTANDING
THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT 2 (2008), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr318.pdf. The related Alt-
$ PDUNHW LV DOVR VXIIHULQJ  7KH ´$OW-$µ PRUWJDJH PDUNHW LV PDGH XS RI
borrowers who may be self-employed, with a reasonable credit standing, but
who have unsteady income. Finance and Economics: Move Over, Subprime;;
Mortgage Losses, ECONOMIST (London), Feb. 7, 2009, at 63, 63. The same lax
lending practices that characterized the subprime market, applied equally to
the Alt-A market: scant documentation and risky, negative-amortization
PRUWJDJHV  ´$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH %DQN IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6HWWOHPHQWV D
staggering 40% of American mortgages originated in the first quarter of 2007
were interest-only or negative-DPRUWL]DWLRQ ORDQVµ  Id. As the risks were
JUHDW´>G@HOLQTXHQFLHVURFNHWHGLQWKHILQDOPRQWKVRIµId. The sharp
drop in house prices has sent half of all Alt-A borrowers into negative equity.
Id. 0RRG\·V´TXDGUXSOHGLWVORVVSURMHFWLRQVRQERQGVEDFNHGE\VXFKORDQV
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normalize their borrowing status through refinancing because
their property lacked equity, and thus they defaulted. These
defaults prompted a tsunami: defaults in the investment-grade
mortgage-EDFNHGVHFXULWLHV ´0%6µ)15 and AAA-rated securities
were downgraded;; investors became jittery;; the price of debt
securities began to fall;; firms had to mark them to market16
and put up more cash by selling more securities;; market prices
plunged;; banks and other financial institutions wrote down the
value of their MBS;; and market prices fell below the intrinsic
value of the underlying assets.17
There continues to be a debate as to whether the brisk
pace of the subprime market caused the collapse of the housing
market, or whether the decline in housing prices was a normal
cycle in the movement of the market in general.18 Regardless,
it is undeniable that the multitude of highly-leveraged
borrowers is an essential factor in the chain of events that have
roiled both the national and international economies of late.19
As the housing market has cooled and as housing prices
have fallen, the national and international effects are stark
and multifarious. In some areas, the fall has been precipitous.
For instance, in Detroit, Las Vegas, and Miami, prices have
dropped at double-digit annual rates.20 Those in economic
of the $59 billion of AAA-rated securities that 0RRG\·VFXWEHWZHHQ-DQXDU\
WKDQG)HEUXDU\QGZHQWVWUDLJKWWRMXQNµId.
15. Mortgage-EDFNHG VHFXULWLHV DUH LQVWUXPHQWV EDVHG XSRQ ´SRROVµ RI
mortgages. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Mortgage-Backed
Securities, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited
Aug. 11, 2009).
16. 7R´PDUNWRPDUNHWµPHDQVWRZULWHGRZQWKHYDOXHIRUDQDVVHWWR
reflect the prevailing market price. See S.E.C. Elects to Keep Mark-to-Market
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at B2.
17. Paul Mizen, The Credit Crunch of 2007-2008: A Discussion of the
Background, Market Reactions, and Policy Responses, 90 FED. RESERVE BANK
OF ST. LOUIS REV. (PART I) 531, 533 (2008).
18. Id. at 531-33.
19. See The Causes and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th
Cong. 26-30 (2008) (statement of Robert F. Wescott, President, Keybridge
Research
LLC),
available
at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081010150253.pdf
(unofficial
transcript).
20. From August 2007 through August 2008, housing prices declined by
twenty-eight percent in Miami, seventeen percent in Detroit, and thirty-one
percent in Las Vegas. See SHARON L. STARK & BARBARA F. BUCKLEY, OFFICE
OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MONTHLY MARKET MONITOR 5 (Oct. 2008), available

5
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distress and who have mortgages under water have been forced
to sell their homes at substantial losses, or else risk
foreclosure.21 Moreover, the estimated number of foreclosures
is expected to range wildly, from four to five million, through
2010, absent drastic intervention.22 Borrowers and lenders
could voluntarily work out a compromise, but subprime
mortgage holders often insist on foreclosure.23 As of the fourth
at http://files.ots.treas.gov/131015.pdf.
21. The percentage of sales attributable to foreclosure rose sharply
between July 2007 and July 2008. See TOM DAY, ZHONG YI TONG & DAVE
MALMQUIST, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MONTHLY MARKET MONITOR 7
(Nov. 2008) [hereinafter DAY, YI TONG & MALMQUIST, Nov. 2008], available at
http://files.ots.treas.gov/131016.pdf. In Miami, the foreclosure rate was
fourteen percent, in Phoenix it was thirty-three percent, and in Los Angeles it
was thirty-four percent. Id. In 2008, a record 1.6 million homeowners lost
their homes to foreclosure. Priorities for the Next Administration: Use of
TARP Funds Under EESA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Serv.,
111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Priorities] (statement of John F. Bovenzi,
Deputy to the Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, Federal Deposit
,QVXUDQFH
&RUSRUDWLRQ
´)',&µ 
available
at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/bovenzi011309.pdf.
In 2009 and 2010, an estimated five million more homeowners will lose their
homes. Id. ´$V RI WKH WKLUG TXDUWHU RI  DSSUR[LPDWHO\  RI
outstanding subprime mortgages [were] in default, and almost 7% [were] in
foreclosure³UDWHV IDU KLJKHU WKDQ IRU SULPH KRPH PRUWJDJHVµ  3KLOLS 5
White & James M. Hirschhorn, :KDWWKH´6XESULPH&ULVLVµ5HDOO\0HDQVIRU
Your Business, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Jan. 2008, at 20, available at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2008/January/20.pdf.
In September
2008, these figures had risen: approximately 24% of mortgages were in
default and 11.5% in foreclosure. TOM DAY, ZHONG YI TONG & DAVE
MALMQUIST, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MONTHLY MARKET MONITOR 11
(Dec. 2008), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/1310171.pdf. In November
2008, the percentage of seriously delinquent subprime mortgages rose to
42.5%. SHARON STARK, ZHONG YI TONG & JONATHAN JONES, OFFICE OF THRIFT
SUPERVISION, MONTHLY MARKET MONITOR 8 (Jan. 2009), available at
http://files.ots.treas.gov/131018.pdf.
22. See Oversight of Implementation of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 and Efforts to Mitigate Foreclosures: Hearing on the
Housing Crisis Before the Subcomm. on Financial Serv. and the General
Government of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (2008)
(statement of Michael Krimminger, Special Advisor for Policy, Office of the
Chairman,
FDIC),
available
at
http://appropriations.senate.gov/ht-
financial.cfm IROORZ ´7HVWLPRQ\ RI 0LFKDHO .ULPPLQJHU RI WKH )',& DW WKH
'HF+RXVLQJ&ULVLV+HDULQJµ Priorities, supra note 21 (statement of John
F. Bovenzi, Deputy to the Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, FDIC)
(predicting that 4 to 5 million foreclosures will occur within the next two
years without government intervention).
23. See EDWARD VINCENT MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE MORATORIUM 9-
10 (2008).
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quarter of 2008, the rate of homeownership declined to 67.5%,
which is 1.3% below its peak of four years earlier, and its
lowest level since the first quarter of 2001.24 The effects of the
crisis are felt more sharply by certain populations within our
society. For instance, the homeownership rate for African-
Americans stood at 46.7% in the third quarter of 2008³3%
below its peak level reached in the third quarter of 2004.25
Foreclosures depress the housing market, leading to more
foreclosures and inevitably resulting in net losses to lenders,
24. See U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership³
Fourth
Quarter
2008:
Table
5,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr408/q408tab5.html
(last
visited Aug. 11, 2009). See also 2008 OFFICE OF FED. HOUS. ENTER.
ANNUAL
REPORT
5,
available
at
OVERSIGHT,
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2097/OFHEOReporttoCongress2008.pdf
UHSRUWLQJ WKDW ´>W@KH QDWLRQDO KRPHRZQHUVKLS UDWH GHFOLQHG IURP 
percent at the end of the fourth quarter of 2006 to 67.8 percent one year
later³the lowest level since the second TXDUWHU RI µ  WKH DJHQF\ KDV
since been renamed the Federal Housing Finance Agency).
25. See Baker, supra note 7, at 2. In fact, the evidence shows that
African-American and Hispanic homeowners over the age of 50 experienced
higher rates of foreclosure than Caucasian homeowners in all age groups, and
URXJKO\ GRXEOH WKHLU UDWH RI KRPHRZQHUVKLS  ´2OGHU $IULFDQ-American
homeowners held 6.8 [percent] of all first mortgages, but represented only
14.4 percent of all foreclosures;; while Hispanic homeowners aged 50 and
older held 7.5 percent of first mortgages, but represented 15.9 percent of all
IRUHFORVXUHVµHelping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of
2009 and Emergency Home Ownership and Protection Act: Hearing on H.R.
200 and H.R. 225 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 3 (2009)
(testimony of David M. Certner, Legal Counsel and Legislative Policy
Director, Association for the Advancement of Retired Persons), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/certner090122.pdf.
Having a subprime loan was found to be associated with
higher foreclosure rates for all age groups, but the impact of
subprime lending was disproportionately greater for older
homeowners[.] Homeowners age 50 and older . . . [were]
nearly 17 times more likely to be in foreclosure than
homeowners of the same age with prime loans . . . .
Id. See also Rick Brooks, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 3. 2007, at A1. Although this is hotly disputed by lenders,
the Wall Street Journal cited allegations that some such borrowers were
steered into subprime loans by brokers and lenders whose commission
structures gave them an incentive to market loans bearing higher interest
rates. Brooks, supra. In addition, the proportion of non-white borrowers who
obtained subprime loans is substantially higher than the proportion of white
borrowers. See Ruth Simon, Illinois Probes Mortgage Firms, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 7, 2008, at A3.
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since these forced sales commonly net only fifty to sixty-five
SHUFHQW RI WKH SURSHUW\·V UHDO YDOXH26
Recent housing
inventory statistics show record or near record levels of homes
on the market.27 The current vacancy rate of 2.7 for ownership
units is more than forty percent higher than the level reached
in any prior housing drop.28 Excessive supply, working in
tandem with high foreclosure rates, will accelerate the
downward pressure on housing prices.29 It was predicted that
home prices would continue to decline through 2009, with
stabilization and recovery beginning in 2010.30 Added to these
losses are increased costs to local governments that provide
emergency shelter and social services to the newly homeless
and neighboring owners.31
While mortgage default rates have risen dramatically over
the past three years across all borrower and interest rate types,
the most dramatic increase has occurred in subprime loans.32
The vintage of the loan was also a significant factor in loan
performance.33 Additionally, in terms of the severity of the
26. STARK, YI TONG & JONES, supra note 21, at 8. See also Amy Crews
Cutts & William A. Merrill, Interventions in Mortgage Default: Policies and
Practices to Prevent Home Loss and Lower Costs, at Table 8, Figures 5, 7,
$SS·[ $ )UHGGLH 0DF :RUNLQJ 3DSHU 1R -01), available at
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Our_Region/Community_Development/pdf/interv
entions_in_mortgage_default_Frank.pdf.
27. DAY, YI TONG & MALMQUIST, Nov. 2008, supra note 21, at 5. But see
STARK, YI TONG & JONES, supra note 21, at 6 (showing a twenty-seven percent
decline in inventory of existing and new homes between August and
November 2008).
28. See Baker, supra note 7, at 2.
29. See id.
30. See DAY, YI TONG & MALMQUIST, Nov. 2008, supra note 21, at 6. See
also SHARON L. STARK & ZHONG YI TONG, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION,
QUARTERLY
MARKET
MONITOR
4-5
(May
2009),
available
at
http://files.ots.treas.gov/131020.pdf (showing an 11.5% decline in home prices
from one year earlier, and a more than 30% decline since the peak in mid-
2006).
31. The cost associated to both the Federal Government and taxpayers
in addressing this crisis nationwide is discussed throughout the Article.
32. See Amy Crews Cutts, supra note 14 (reporting that the rate of
default on subprime adjustable rate mortgages was 20 times higher than the
rate of default on prime fixed rate mortgages, and that subprime loans
accounted for over half of foreclosures begun since 2006).
33. The year 2007 had the worst overall loan performance, as compared
to 2006, 2005, and 2004, respectively. See SHARON L. STARK & ZHONG YI
TONG, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MONTHLY MARKET MONITOR 8 (May
2009), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/131020.pdf.
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losses that occurred, subprime loans were the most costly.34
It appears that the effect of pushing so many moderate
income families into homeownership on any terms in the
bubble-inflated market of the last few years was a cruel play, a
set-XS WR IRUHFORVXUH DQG WKH ORVV RI PDQ\ IDPLOLHV· KRPHV
:KDWZDVRQFHWKRXJKWWREHWKHDFKLHYHPHQWRIWKH´$PHULFDQ
drHDPµ LV QRZ D QLJKWPDUH³´not an obvious route . . . [to]
ZHDOWKµ35 Indeed, the statistics reveal that it was all just
about the money, the profits from high-rate loans, and nothing
more.36
II. Crisis in the Financial Markets
In a single month in 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average lost 1,514 points, reflecting price movements ranging
between 2,937 points.37 In that same month, the Chicago
%RDUG 2SWLRQV ([FKDQJH 9RODWLOLW\ ,QGH[ ´9,;µ  UHDFKHG DQ
34. As of November 2008, subprime loans sustained 62.3 cents on the
dollar, followed by option ARMs at 52.3 cents, Alt-As at 51.2 cents, and jumbo
loans at 37.2 cents. Id. at 7-8. In regards to vintage, 2007 subprime loans
sustained the highest, relative to 2006, 2005, and 2004 respectively. Id. at 7.
35. Baker, supra note 7, at 2.
36. Yet swift ride of the loan originators has also come to an abrupt halt.
Several of the top loan companies have suffered massive losses. Countrywide
Financial lost $893 million in the first quarter of 2008, the third consecutive
TXDUWHUO\ORVVIRUWKHQDWLRQ·VODUJHVWPRUWJDJHOHQGHUDQGORDQVHUYLFHUSee
Countrywide Says it Lost $893 Million in Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008,
DW&7KLVZDVDGUDVWLFGHFUHDVHLQFRPSDULVRQWR&RXQWU\ZLGH·VHDUQLQJV
of $434 million just a year earlier. Id. ,Q  &RXQWU\ZLGH KDG ´FKDUJH-
RIIVµ RU ORDQV ZULWWHQ RII DV QRW UHSDLG ZKLFK WRWDOHG  PLOOLRQ DV
opposed to $39 million in 2007.
Id.
In addition, delinquencies in
&RXQWU\ZLGH·VVHUYLFLQJSRUWIROLRGRXEOHGLQXSWRSHUFHQWIURP
percent in 2007. Id. All the while, loan applications continued to rise by
more than 27 percent, totaling $2.2 billion. Id. On January 4, 2009,
Countrywide agreed to be purchased by Bank of America at a price of $4
billion. See Gretchen Morgenson, &RXQWU\ZLGH·V %X\HU ,VQ·W %OLQNLQJ, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2008, at BU1. Additionally, early in 2008, IndyMac Bancorp
reported sharp increases in delinquencies and foreclosures, which resulted in
its stock price falling $1.23 per share. Thornburg, A Mortgage Lender, Misses
Margin Calls, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at C3. The number of delinquencies
on the loans it serviced, specifically those loans at least thirty days past due,
´URVH WR  SHUFHQW LQ -DQXDU\ IURP  SHUFHQW LQ 'HFHPEHU DQG 
SHUFHQWLQWKHILUVWTXDUWHURIµ Id. Delinquencies among prime loans
rose to 6.85 percent, up from 3.83 percent in 2007. Id. Subprime mortgage
delinquencies rose to 28.18 percent, up from 18.55 percent a year earlier. Id.
37. See DAY, YI TONG & MALMQUIST, Nov. 2008, supra note 21, at 1.
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all-time high of 80.1%.38
The year 2008 can also be
remembered for the collapse and disappearance of venerable
banks and financial institutions: Bear Stearns (bought out by
J.P. Morgan Chase),39 Merrill Lynch (bought by Bank of
America),40 Lehman Brothers (filed for bankruptcy),41
Wachovia Bank (bought by Wells Fargo)42 and Countrywide
FLQDQFLDO WKH FRXQWU\·V ODUJHVW ORDQ RULJLQDWRU ERXJKW E\
The Federal Deposit Insurance
Bank of America).43
&RUSRUDWLRQ ´)',&µ  WRRN RYHU PDQ\ EDQNV WKDW KDG RYHU-
extended themselves, such as IndyMac44 and Washington
Mutual.45 These institutions had amassed so much debt that
threatened to overwhelm them. That debt was largely from
investments in the secondary market³that is, they bought and
sold mortgage-backed securities.46
38. See STARK, YI TONG & JONES, supra note 21, at 4. The VIX is
VRPHWLPHVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKH´IHDULQGH[µDOWKRXJKLWPHDVXUHVYRODWLOLW\LQ
either direction. Id. Another indication of turmoil in the market is changes
in the LIBOR rate. See id. For example, the LIBOR rate rose from 2.15
percent on September 12, 2008, to 6.44 percent on September 16, 2008. See
%ULWLVK %DQNHUV· $VVRFLDWLRQ +LVWRULF /,%25 5DWHV 6HSW    
(on file with the %ULWLVK%DQNHUV·$VVRFLDWLRQDQGDXWKRU 
39. See Robin Sidel, J.P. Morgan Rescues Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 17, 2008, at A1.
40. See Matthew Karnitschnig, Bank of America to Buy Merrill, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at A1.
41. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape
Landscape of Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1.
42. See Dan Fitzpatrick, Wells Fargo Grabs Wachovia as Citi Walks,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2008, at C1.
43. See Morgenson, supra note 36.
In addition, the American
,QWHUQDWLRQDO*URXS ´$,*µ ZDVRQWKHEULQNRIFROODSVHXQWLOUHVFXHGE\WKH
Department of Treasury.
44. See Louise Story, Regulators Seize IndyMac After a Run on the Bank,
N.Y. TIMES, July. 12, 2008, at C1.
45. See Eric Dash & Andre Ross Sorkin, In Largest Bank Failure, U.S.
Seizes, Then Sells, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A1. In the FDIC Quarterly
%DQNLQJ 3URILOH 5HSRUW LQ WKH WKLUG TXDUWHU RI  ´H[SHQVHV IRU FUHGLW
losses topped $50 billion for a second consecutive quarter. . . . [T]hird quarter
net income totaled $1.7 billion, a decline of $27.0 billion (94.0 percent) from
the third quarter of 2007. . . . [A]lmost one in every four institutions (24.1
SHUFHQW  UHSRUWHG D QHW ORVV IRU WKH TXDUWHU    µ   FDIC QUARTERLY
BANKING PROFILE 1, at 1 (2008).
46. Securitization is the transformation of groups of similar kinds of
receivables (credit card debt, leases, and mortgages, for instance) into
securities that can then be sold to investors. For example, commercial loans
can be converted into collateralL]HG GHEW REOLJDWLRQV ´&'2Vµ  ZKLFK HQWLWOH
the investors to receive specific cash flows generated by the loans. The pool
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Mortgage-backed securities based on pools of mortgages
have been safely sold since the conversion of Fannie Mae into a
government-chartered private corporation and the creation of
Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae.47 But, more recently, these
securities became unduly risky when they became based on
subprime mortgages.48 In the past decade, market participants
LJQRUHG WKHVH ULVNV DV WKH\ ´GLVFRYHUHG WKDW FDVK IORZV IURP
pools of mortgages could be structured so that one class of
investors bore a minimal risk of default while others bore
LQFUHDVLQJO\ JUHDWHU ULVNµ49 Because of this division of risk,
´LQYHVWPHQW JUDGH VHFXULWLHV FRXOG EH FUHDWHGµ DOPRVW
PDJLFDOO\ ´WR ILQDQFH PRUWJDJHV IRU SHRSOH ZKR SUHYLRXVO\
ZHUHQRWFUHGLWZRUWK\µ50 Issuers of these securities promised a
reduced risk from default on the underlying subprime
mortgages by keeping:
[A] margin between the amount of mortgages
held by the pool and the amount of [securities]
issued, by [setting] an interest rate spread
between the mortgages and the [securities], and
by various guarantees, insurance and hedging
techniques. The remaining risk of default was
allocated among different payment tranches, so
that [the lowest price securities] would be
exposed to the earliest defaults while the most
secure would have priority over whatever
payment came in. The most secure tranches
were rated investment grade by the credit rating
agencies, which made them eligible for purchase
of mortgages underlying the security is often divided up into tranches,
assigning various amounts of risks and returns, and making them suitable
for a variety of different investors. The issuance of these securities provided
liquidity to many different markets and spread the risk among the issuers
and investors, as well as the borrowers on the other side. Issuers of the
securities usually did this through special purpose entities or structured
investment vehicles, whereby the underlying assets and their liabilities were
reflected on different sets of books.
47. Lawrence J. White, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Housing Finance:
Why True Privatization is Good Public Policy, 528 CATO INST. POLICY
ANALYSIS 1, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa528.pdf.
48. White & Hirschhorn, supra note 21, at 20.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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by insurance companies and ERISA regulated
pension funds.
The less secure received
speculative grade ratings and many were
purchased and pooled as the basis for so-called
collateralized debt obligations.51
All of the struggling institutions mentioned above52 seemed
to have been afflicted with the same malady: under-pricing of
risk.53 Perhaps this was due to the novelty of these securities.54
But some economists say that mispricing risk occurs during
both boom times and crashes, when rational thinking is
overcome by greed and fear.55 In a boom, over-confident
investors take on bets that they later find themselves unable to
discharge. In this crisis, the players made one-way bets³that
the markets would only go up. They did not anticipate the
´black swansµRUWKH´dragons.µ56
In 1983, Ben Bernanke offered an analysis of the causes
and effects of the Great Depression.57 The current Chairman of
the Federal Reserve then commented on the causality between
adverse developments in the macroeconomy (or, declines in
aggregate output) and bank failures, with respect to their
coincidences and to the persistence of the relevant financial

51. Id. CDOs are defined as mechanisms for converting mortgage
securities and corporate bonds from large, illiquid assets into liquid financial
instruments. See FDIC, Enhancing Transparency in the Structured Finance
Market, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, Summer 2008, at 5-9, 13;; Mizen, supra note
17, at 538. They are structured financial products, usually backed by pools of
mortgages, and typically sliced into tranches with varying degrees of risk and
projected returns. See FDIC, supra, at 5;; Mizen, supra note 17, at 538.
52. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
53. See generally Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Jan. 4, 2009, at 24.
54. See White & Hirschhorn, supra note 21, at 20.
55. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 36-39 (5th ed. 2005).
56. These unusual references stand for the unknown variables in risk
calculations that take place more frequently than we are willing to
FRQWHPSODWH´%HFDXVHZHGRQ·WNQRZZKDWDEODFNVZDQPLJKWORRNOLNHRU
ZKHQLWPLJKWDSSHDUDQGWKHUHIRUHGRQ·WSODQIRU it, it will always get us in
WKHHQGµ1RFHUDsupra note 53, at 29. 6HHDOVR,Q3ODWR·V&DYH, ECONOMIST
(SPECIAL REPORT) (London), Jan. 24, 2009, at 12, 14.
57. Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the
Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 258-63 (1983).
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crisis.58 There were arguments on both sides of this causality
issue. One view was that the problems of the financial system
had tended to lead to output declines;; in fact, sources of
financial panics unconnected with the fall in output have been
documented by many writers.59 The other view was that
industrial production had begun to decline before the financial
crisis set in.60 While not taking a firm position on the causality
issue, throughout his analysis, Bernanke stressed the
importance of recognizing the role of exogenous events, which
influence estimates of future cash flows and lead to endogenous
changes in prevailing levels of risk adversity in the availability
of credit and contractions in the money supply.61
&DQ %HUQDQNH·V LQVLJKWV H[SODLQ WKH XQGHU-pricing of
subprime risk? Could the liquidity of Asian and Middle
Eastern investors be viewed as an exogenous factor? Or, could
this under-pricing have been intentional and not the result of
euphoria or ignorance? As the market for mortgages grew to
include private entities³who bought, sold, and packaged
mortgage-backed securities at a seemingly frenzied pace³the
race was not only to the swift, but to the bottom as well. There
The investment
ZDV D ´SHUYHUVH LQFHQWLYHµ RSHUDWLQJ62
bankers knew or should have known in advance (after all, they
KDYHWKHNQRZOHGJHDQGH[SHUWLVH WKDW´WKHLUWLPH>ZRXOG@UXQ
RXWDQGWKH>LQYHVWPHQW@IXQG>ZRXOG@FROODSVHµ63 The strategy
WKH\ HPSOR\HG ZDV ´WR PD[LPL]H DQQXDO UHWXUQµ EXW RQO\
(FRQRPLVW $QWKRQ\ '·$PDWR GHVFULEHs the
ostensibly.64
strategy in this way:
Suppose [the bankers] are buying bundled
mortgages. Someday, all the mortgages will
collapse, but until they do the investor in the
fund has no idea about the comparative risk

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 261-63.
See, e.g., id. at 267.
Id.
See id. at 271.
$QWKRQ\ '·$PDWR Letter: Hedge Funds Race to the Bottom,
ECONOMISTS·
9OICE,
June
2008,
at
1,
available
at
KWWSZZZEHSUHVVFRPHYYROLVVDUW IROORZ´'RZQORDGµ 
63. Id.
64. Id.
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between types of bundles. Thus the [banker] will
simply buy the bundles that come on the market
with the highest interest rate of return. (If the
choice is between bundle A that contains mainly
prime mortgages and pays 10%, and bundle B
that contains nothing but the riskiest sub-prime
mortgages and pays 14%, the [banker] need not
engage in any qualitative calculations. He only
needs to know that 14 is higher than 10.) Thus
there is a race to the bottom. The worse and
riskiest bundles (of mortgages or any other debt
instruments such as car loans or credit cards)
will attract the most investor money, keeping the
game alive and compounding it. Fortunately for
the [banker], he pays himself annually. (He also
takes bonuses, which often exceed his payments
for managing the fund.)65
The investment bankers had plausible deniability if this
strategy failed³they could claim earnest and honest reliance
on the evaluation of the ratings agencies. But this earnestness
can now be seen through. The agencies also responded to the
incentives inherent in the regulatory use of ratings.66 The
continued flow of business to the agencies depended upon their
reports of acceptable ratings. ,Q 0DUFK  WKH 3UHVLGHQW·V
Working Group on Financial Markets, the two-decades-old
committee representing the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the
6HFXULWLHV DQG ([FKDQJH &RPPLVVLRQ ´6(&µ  DQG WKH
65. Id. In 2006, the CEOs of the big five investment banks, Goldman
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns,
took home a total of $166.4 million in bonuses. See KEVIN CONNOR, NAT·L
TRAINING & INFO. CTR., ET AL., WALL STREET AND THE MAKING OF THE SUBPRIME
DISASTER: HOW INVESTMENT BANKS FUELED THE SUBPRIME BOOM, MADE
BILLIONS, AND CAUSED THE CURRENT FORECLOSURE CRISIS 6-7 (2007), available
at
http://subprimer.org/files/wall-street-and-the-making-of-the-subprime-
disaster.pdf. In 2007, firm bonuses topped $38 billion. Id. at 25. See also
David Weidner, Making Greed Good, WSJ.COM, Sept. 3, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125189899520579603.html
(reporting
on
executive compensation). These bonuses were made despite more than $50
billion write-downs by these companies. CONNOR, supra, at 22. In January
2009, it was discovered that as Merrill Lynch negotiated its takeover by Bank
of America, it also paid out $4 billion in bonuses at the end of 2008. Dave
Krasne, Money for Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at A31.
66. See ASHCRAFT & SCHUERMANN, supra note 14, at 12.
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Commodity Futures Trading Commission, described the origins
of the mortgage market fiasco in terms of the conflicts of
LQWHUHVW EHWZHHQ ZKDW HFRQRPLVWV FDOO WKH ´SULQFLSDOVµ
(investors and homH EX\HUV  DQG WKHLU ´DJHQWVµ PRUWJDJH
brokers, securities brokers, and credit analysts).67 Principals
relied on agents to evaluate the risks on their behalf.68 But the
agents, whose income largely depended on the number of deals
they put together, had powerful incentives to understate risk:
they assumed unrealistically low expected losses on subprime
pools and failed to revise their assumptions upwards, even in
the face of rising defaults and changes in the population of loan
originators and borrowers on the underlying instruments.69
The estimates were low³not only as to their probability of
default, but also as to the magnitude of the losses that would
result.70
Could there have been too much reliance on mathematical
models? Models that purported to manage risks³to capture
the behavior of a market and to link an observable or illiquid
price to prices in traded markets? The modeling became
problematic when pools of mortgages were bundled up into
FROODWHUDOL]HG GHEW REOLJDWLRQV ´&'2Vµ 71 CDOs, because of
their complex layering, became impossible to model in any but
a most rudimentary way, largely because each contained a
unique combination of assets.72
Each CDO would be sold on the basis of its own
scenario, using central assumptions about the
future of interest rates and defaults to
´GHPRQVWUDWHµWKHSD\RXWVRYHUVD\WKHQH[W
67. See generally THE PRESIDENT·S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS.,
POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT (2008), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_031
22008.pdf [hereinafter POLICY STATEMENT];; THE PRESIDENT·S WORKING GROUP
ON FIN. MKTS., PROGRESS UPDATE ON MARCH POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL
MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (2008) [hereinafter PROGRESS UPDATE], available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/q4progress%20update.pdf.
68. See generally POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 67;; PROGRESS UPDATE,
supra note 67.
69. See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 14.
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
72. See Greed³and Fear, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REPORT) (London), Jan.
24, 2009, at 4.
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years. This central scenario would then be
´VWUHVV-WHVWHGµ WR VKRZ WKDW WKH &'2 ZDV
robust³though oddly the tests did not include a
20% fall in house prices.73
History is a dangerous basis for modeling.74 The models also
failed to take into account other critical variables, like falling
underwriting standards (i.e., not requiring documentation or
little documentation, and accepting low credit scores), and
conflicts of interests affecting the ratings by credit ratings
agencies.75 It seems that corporate and mortgage-backed
VHFXULWLHV´ZHUHDOHDSLQWKHGDUNµDVQRRQHNQHZZKDWWKH\
were ignoring, and therefore failed to correct for any
inadequacies in the model.76
The most prominent mathematical model employed was
WKH ´9DOXH-at-5LVNµ PRGHO EXLOW DURXQG ORQJ-standing
statistical ideas and probability theories.77 It purports to
measure the boundaries of risk in a portfolio over short
GXUDWLRQVDVVXPLQJD´QRUPDOµPDUNHWWKDWis, to measure the
SRWHQWLDO ORVVHV RI D SRUWIROLR VXSSRVHGO\ ´WR VKRZ ZKHWKHU
banks and other financial outfits are being safely run. . . . [And]
KRZ PXFK FDSLWDO EDQNV QHHG WR SXW DVLGH IRU D UDLQ\ GD\µ78
For instance, if one has $50 million of weekly value at risk,
that means that over the course of the next week, there is a 99
SHUFHQW FKDQFH WKDW RQH·V SRUWIROLR ZRQ·W ORVH PRUH WKDQ 
million.79 That should provide a bit of comfort to the investor,
particularly one whose investments are fairly diversified. But
the essential and overwhelming flaw in the formula, one so
large as to put into question its fundamental soundness, is that
LWRQO\PHDVXUHVNQRZQULVNVQRW´WDLOULVNVµWKDWLVULVNVDW

73. ,Q3ODWR·V&DYH, supra note 56, at 13.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The model was developed and popularized in the 1990s by
´TXDQWVµ VKRUW-hand for financial economists who apply quantification
formulas for investment decisions. Nocera, supra note 53, at 26.
78. ,Q3ODWR·V&DYH, supra note 56, at 13.
79. Nocera, supra note 53, at 29. For an example of miscalculations in
1998 by the hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, see FERGUSON,
supra note 9, at 325-27. See also infra note 145 and accompanying text.
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the extremes of investment decisions.80 The model assumes a
normal distribution of changes and risks in the market,81
looking only to the short-term, and only a few years back, and
does not distinguish between the leverage that comes from
long-term fixed rate debt (such as bonds) and that from loans
callable at any time.82 What is not reported is the impact of the
UHPDLQLQJRQHSHUFHQWRUWKH´EODFNVZDQVµRU´GUDJRQVµ83 It
GRHVQRWWHOO\RXIRULQVWDQFH´>W@KDWWKHPLOOLRQ>LVQ·W@MXVW
the most one could lose 99 percent of the time. It [in fact] was
WKH OHDVW \RX FRXOG ORVH  SHUFHQW RI WKH WLPHµ84 Too much
reliance on the fact of quantification, rather than on market
observations and the not-so-distant historical trends, and too
much absence of judgment are the essential culprits in this
crisis.85
Even if the asset managers knowingly underpriced the
risk, how could institutional investors have accepted the asset
PDQDJHUV· DVVHVVPHQWs at face value³particularly with so
little market history to examine³since subprime loans were,
relatively speaking, a rather new investment tool? Only after
2006 did the subprime mortgage losses begin to rise
dramatically.86 The relatively low rate of losses occurred
during a time of economic boom, where the probability of
default and loss given default was expected to be low. If the
investors had knowledge of the composition of the pool³i.e.,
that there was a greater percentage of higher-risk borrowers,
with a greater percentage of adjustable rate mortgages³they
might have suspected that under-pricing of risk was occurring.
80. See Nocera, supra note 53, at 46.
81. The research, however, clearly shows that the market is wildly
unstable. 6HH ,Q 3ODWR·V &DYH, supra note 56, at 14 (describing a study by
mathematician Benoît Mandelbrot, who invented the fractal theory).
82. See Nocera, supra note 53, at 29. In markets, extreme events are
surprisingly common³WKHWDLOVDUH´IDWµId.;; ,Q3ODWR·V&DYH, supra note 56,
at 14.
83. See Nocera, supra note 53, at 29. See also supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
84. Nocera, supra note 53, at 50.
85. Id. at 50. The use of these models in valuing MBS is in stark
contrast to the method of valuing corporate debt, where the particulars of the
institution are considered and evaluated. Mizen, supra note 17, at 541, 545.
86. SHARON L. STARK & ZHONG YI TONG, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION,
MONTHLY MARKET MONITOR 11, 14-15 (Mar. 2009), available at
http://files.ots.treas.gov/131020.pdf.
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Still the omens were apparent, as early as 2005, with evidence
of mounting performance problems and calls for vigilance by
economists87³but the originators kept writing loans, indeed at
a feverish pace. Ratings agencies transparently understated
risk and inflated the grading scale of their debt ratings for
securitized products in order for institutional investors to
invest and stay within their guidelines and regulations.88 This
occurred when the ratings agencies ceased to be dispassionate
appraisers of the merits of the product, and instead, worked to
reach a desired rating by participating in discussions about
exactly how to design and structure the securities.89
While it was true that there were capital requirements in
place, these requirements were either relaxed by the SEC, or
evaded by conduits of MBS through the device of a structured
investment vehicle.90 Again, subterfuges and obfuscations
were prevalent.

87. See generally KRISTOPHER S. GERARDI ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF
BOSTON, MAKING SENSE OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2009) (stating that, given
the available data, market participants should have been able to understand
that a fall in prices would have had disastrous consequences for the market,
but instead, assigned a low probability to such an outcome);; Paul Krugman,
Op-Ed., That Hissing Sound, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2005, at A15 (same);; Robert
-6KLOOHU´,UUDWLRQDO([XEHUDQFHµ³Part 2, MONEY, Feb. 2005, at 71 (same).
88. See William G. McGuinness & John W. Brewer, Credit Ratings
Agencies Under the Microscope, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 5, 2009, at S6.
89. See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 1-2;; PROGRESS UPDATE,
supra note 67, at 1-3.
90. In 2001, a new Treasury rule was adopted that essentially stated
that when retaining a first-loss position in a securitization conduit, the
sponsoring institution was required to maintain an equal amount of capital to
the size of the retained position. However, this requirement could be
FLUFXPYHQWHG WKURXJK WKH GHYLFH RI D VWUXFWXUHG LQYHVWPHQW YHKLFOH ´6,9µ 
See 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 567.1, 567.5, 567.6 (2009) (exempting
conduit sponsors from newly enacted GAAP consolidation rules for
securitization, which otherwise would have required securitized assets to be
treated as on-balance sheet assets for purposes of calculating capital
requirements). An SIV is an entity, typically a corporation or trust formed by
investment banks, to sell or to hold mortgage-backed securities, owned by,
but legally distinct from, the lender. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines;; Capital
Adequacy Guidelines;; Capital Maintenance: Consolidation of Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper Programs and Other Related Issues, 69 Fed. Reg. 44,908-
01 (July 28, 2004). The SIV may resell the loan pools to a second SIV, which
is also independent of the lender and takes title to the bundle. The second
SPV is typically in the form of a trust. See id. A Treasury exemption made
this ruse legal. See id.
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III. Crisis in the Courts and Havoc With Land Titles
Many of the firms that profited from the subprime lending
boom are now hobbling and experiencing severe losses as they
are forced to contract. Many are insolvent. Many have seen
their stock prices plummet. As one might expect, securities
fraud claims have been filed against these firms and their
directors and officers, charging, among other things,
misrepresentation about the nature and quality of the assets
underlying the securities, as well as breach of fiduciary duty in
continuing to deal in the subprime market despite clear
evidence of impending collapse.91
State court dockets have swelled with foreclosure
complaints. State courts are the only venues for such relief, as
foreclosures began in the early courts of equity where they gave
mortgagors a right to redeem their property before
foreclosure.92 Federal bankruptcy courts, as homeowners and
91. One study reports as many as 136 securities class action suits based
on subprime losses filed as of early 2008. JENNIFER E. BETHEL ET AL.,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, LAW AND ECONOMICS ISSUES IN SUBPRIME LITIGATION
67-72
(2008),
available
at
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1400&context=harvard_olin.
Other research suggests that the forty-three percent rise in securities
violations cases in 2007 may have been attributable to the subprime
mortgage crisis. See U.S. CHAMBERS INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES
CLASS
ACTION
LITIGATION
2,
5
n.7
(2008),
available
at
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?docId=1213. Nonetheless,
shareholders seeking recovery against corporate officers and directors will be
met with the almost insurmountable barriers of the Private Litigation
Securities Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006)) (imposing heightened pleading
requirements and requiring particularity on the element of scienter) and the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
(asserting exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal securities litigation
claims). To date, there has been at least one suit against an ERISA fiduciary
that alleges breach of fiduciary duty by investing in subprime mortgage
backed securities. See generally Thomas J. Hall & Thomas J. McCormack,
Financial Meltdown Triggers Litigation Wave, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 5, 2009, at S2
(discussing the various kinds of suits filed, including misrepresentations by
CDO issuers, securities fraud, funding suspension, unfair and defective
practices against loan originators, and breach of fiduciary duty by corporate
officers and directors);; Manfred Ohrenstein & Matthew Bryant, Subprime
Litigation: New Theories, Same Rules, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 30, 2008, at 4.
92. In 2007, 57,000 foreclosure complaints were filed in New York,
representing a ten percent increase in filings from 2006, and a fifty-five
percent increase from 2005. See Joel Stashenko, Pfau Tells Lawmakers
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LQYHVWPHQW EDQNV VHHN DXWRPDWLF VWD\V RI FUHGLWRUV· DFWLRQV93
and federal courts of general jurisdiction, with exclusive
jurisdiction over securities fraud claims, have also experienced
dramatic increases in case filings.
In the state court proceedings, attorneys for mortgagors
are taking the offensive and asserting traditional causes of
action against lenders³including civil fraud, unfair debt
collection practices, and predatory lending claims³but they
are also advancing new theories for recovery of damages from
mortgagees and to preclude foreclosure.94 Because they played
more than their usual role as evaluators of creditworthiness,
credit rating agencies may also face suit as participants in
fraudulent schemes.95 Both the SEC and the Attorney General
of New York have already opened investigations into the

Courts Not Equipped to Handle Proposed Foreclosure Conferences, N.Y. L.J.,
May 13, 2008, at 1. In the first three months of 2008, filings were fourteen
percent over the first three months of 2007. Id. See also N.Y. CT. R. 212.12-a
(requiring pre-foreclosure court conferences, with the aim to avert foreclosure
through modifications, forbearances, and extensions);; Ann Pfau, Residential
Mortgage Foreclosure Program, Essay, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 19, 2008, at 6
(discussing the new Court Rule in New York State and the programs set up
by legal services entities to assist homeowners in the process).
93. A recent article estimated that of the $633 billion of Lehman
%URWKHUV· GHEW  ELOOLRQ LV WKH SURMHFWHG DPRXQW RI IHHV WKDW ODZ\HUV
accountants, and other professionals may earn from working on that
bankruptcy. Jill Schachner Chanen, Lehman by the Numbers, 95 A.B.A. J.
12, 12 (2009). Of that $1.6 billion, $53 million is projected as fees to counsel
for the Creditors· &RPPLWWHH DQG  PLOOLRQ IRU WKH ILUP·V EDQNUXSWF\
counsel. Id.
94. See Steven Seidenberg, Homing In On Foreclosure: Lawyers Are
Finding Aggressive Defenses Against Foreclosure Actions. And Courts Are
Listening As Never Before, 94 A.B.A. J. 54, 54 (2008);; White & Hirschhorn,
supra note 21, at 20. Another theory that may be available to buyers of MBS
is to argue that they are third-party beneficiaries of these contracts between
the borrowers and lenders, and that therefore, can assert claims against
those in this nexus for fraud or misrepresentation in the sale of mortgages in
the pool, for failure to enforce the underlying mortgages and for failure to
make good on insurance and guarantees. See Seidenberg, supra, at 54;; White
& Hirschhorn, supra note 21, at 20.
95. See McGuinness & Brewer, supra note 88, at S6. But, will credit
ratings agencies succumb to liability in suits by purchasers of the securities
they rated? Traditionally they have fared well because of several theoretical
barriers, including those that find that the ratings were merely opinions and
therefore protected by the First Amendment, as well as those that find no
showing of malice, no reliance, no causation, and thus no common questions
of law or fact to enable class certification. See id.
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underwritings and sales of mortgage-backed securities.96
Title insurers now face tremendous risks because of the
way in which securitization of mortgages is done. Often no
formal assignment of the mortgage is made;; that is, entities
involved in originating and securitizing loans frequently do not
comply with the formalities of assigning the mortgage notes
and physically transferring them.97 This means that a title
search will not necessarily reveal who owns the mortgage. One
significant consequence of this system is that, at the time of a
foreclosure action, the foreclosing entity may not be the current
right holder.98
IV. Call For Ethics and Reforms
The failure of finance will affect ideology. Perhaps,
because the crisis in the markets was unprecedented and its
RULJLQVVRQRYHOWKH)HGHUDO*RYHUQPHQW·VUHVSRQVHVFRXOGQRW
be anything other than piecemeal, ad hoc, and a form of trial
and error. The crisis hit worldwide, as financial systems across
the globe are highly interconnected.99
American economist, Irving Fisher, remarked nearly a
century ago that once started, deflation tends to feed on
itself.100 As incomes fall in a depressed economy, the burden of
debt becomes more onerous, and the prospect of further decline
produces a demoralizing effect and discourages investment.

1.

96. See SEC Probes Subprime, NAT·L MORTGAGE NEWS, Sept. 22, 2008, at

97. See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532,
07CV2560, 07CV2602, 07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 07CV2695,
07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950, 07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007
WL 3232430, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007). See also /D6DOOH %DQN 1DW·O
$VV·QY/DP\1<6G 6XS&W  PRUWJDJes that were in the
process of foreclosure had been assigned by Mortgage Electronic Registration
6\VWHPV ,QF ´0(56µ  EXW QRWHV KDG QRW \HW EHHQ WUDQVIHUUHG   )RU D
discussion of MERS, see MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 8 N.Y.3d 90 (2006).
98. See generally Seidenberg, supra note 94 (reporting on the dismissal
of fourteen separate foreclosure complaints because the plaintiffs failed to
produce documentation confirming that they were the holders and owners of
the mortgages on which they were seeking to foreclose). See also, e.g., In re
Foreclosure Cases, 2007 WL 3232430, at *3.
99. See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 8-9, 15-16.
100. See Paul Krugman, On the Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at A27.
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The result is a spiral to the death.101 The same can be said for
other forms of financing instability;; the cycle is self-
propagating and self-fulfilling.102
7KH *RYHUQPHQW·V ILUVW UHVSRQVH WR WKH ORRPLQJ ILQDQFLDO
crisis was to provide liquidity to markets generally. It made
money available for short-term loans and it lowered the target
rate for federal funds.103 But in early 2008, when the evidence
started mounting that many firms were overextended, a panic
set in.104
In September 2008, the Federal Government placed
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under conservatorship as a
preemptive measure against collapse GXH WR WKH LQVWLWXWLRQV·
mountains of debt.105 When the monetary policy measures
proved ineffective, the Secretary of the Treasury thought the
only way to get the economy moving again was by removing the
troubled assets from the EDQNV· books.106 This plan was

101. See id.
102. KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 55, at 21-29.
103. POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 5. See also DAY, YI TONG &
MALMQUIST, Nov. 2008, supra QRWHDW QRWLQJWKDW´WKH)HGHUDO5HVHUYH
lowered the target rate for federal funds on December 16[, 2008] to a range
betweHQ ]HUR DQG  >EDVH SRLQWV@µ   See also generally FED. RESERVE BD.,
ANNUAL REPORT 2008: MONETARY POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/annual08/sec1/c1.htm.
104. The case of Bear Stearns stands out. In March 2008, while the firm
was solvent, it was highly leveraged (and heavily dependent upon overnight
repossessions). Mizen, supra note 17, at 549. Creditors were unwilling to
allow the firm to hobble along until it eventually collapsed under its own
weight. Id. Previously, two hedge funds that were advised by Bear and were
created to invest subprime mortgage-related assets had collapsed. Id. at 533.
%HFDXVH RI %HDU·V KHDY\ H[SRVXUH WR PRUWJDJH-related assets, its creditors
became jittery, despite the fact that the firm was adequately capitalized
under SEC rules and its secured debt was UDWHG$$$E\6WDQGDUG 3RRU·V
Id. at 559. The Federal Reserve intervened to broker a deal to rescue Bear
Stearns. Id. at 549, 557-58.
105. On September 7, 2008, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance
Agency announced the Federal takeover;; both entities were placed into
conservatorship run by the Federal Housing Finance Agency in order to
ensure their financial soundness. See Statement of James B. Lockhart,
Director, Federal Housing and Finance Agency (Sept. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/fhfa_statement_090708hp112
8.pdf.
106. See 7URXEOHG$VVHWV5HOLHI3URJUDP ´7$53µ 3XE/1R-343,
122 Stat. 3768 (2008) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211-41). Under the
Program, $700 billion was appropriated for, among other things, the
purchase of worthless assets from firms. Id.
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designed to address the SKHQRPHQRQ RI ´FRXQWHUSDUW\ ULVNµ
WKDW LV WKH VLWXDWLRQ WKDW RFFXUV ZKHQ WKH ZLQQHUV·107 extra
VSHQGLQJPD\QRWRIIVHWWKHORVHUV·108 retrenchment.109 And the
losers may not be able to afford to pay out, because they do not
have the money³they are insolvent³or because they cannot
easily raise the money³they are illiquid.110 By effectively
recapitalizing banks, the Treasury would minimize the
In later efforts, the
appearance of counterparty risk.111
Treasury opted to purchase equity stakes in the distressed
financial institutions.112
107. I.e., those whose investments pay off.
108. I.e., those whose investments sink.
109. See Strategy: Signs of an Early American Recovery, FUND STRATEGY,
Nov. 24, 2008, at 16 (2008) (London).
110. See id. In fact, the bulk of the cash infusions were used as
recapitalizations. See generally U.S. Office of the Special Inspector General
for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, www.sigtarp.gov/reports.shtml (last
visited Oct. 31, 2009) (reporting on the use of TARP funds). Without it, it
was thought that many banks would have become insolvent. Still, the
underlying problems remain³the toxic assets are still on the books and
banks are still not lending. See David Stout, Better Answers Sought on
%DQNV· 8VH RI $LG, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, at B8 (reporting on how the
original strategy proved ineffective as banks hoarded their new capital
instead of making loans);; Regulator Says Bailout Fund is Misleading the
Public, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at B2 (reporting that testimony before a
Senate oversight committee claimed that Secretary of the Treasury, Henry
M. Paulson, Jr., had misled Congress by not doing what he said he would do;;
that the EDLORXW ´ZDV RSDTXH DW EHVWµ;; that of the $254 billion invested into
financial institutions at the time, only $176 million in value had been
received;; and that the shortfall was not accounted for or explained).
$PHULFDQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO*URXS ´$,*µ RQFHWKHZRUOG·VODUJHVWLQVXUHUZDV
bailed out by the Federal Government when it became clear that it would not
be able to honor its vast one-way bets on financial stability. James Bullard,
Christopher J. Neely & David C. Wheelock, Systemic Risk and the Financial
Crisis: A Primer, 91 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. (PART I) 403, 412
(2009). If AIG had failed, the banks on the other side would have been in
trouble. Although the market netted to zero, it was poised for disaster. Id.
111. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address, Understanding the
Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 556 (2009). However, the
VLJQLILFDQW HDUO\ SUREOHP ZLWK WKLV SURJUDP ZDV YDOXLQJ WKHVH ´WURXEOHG
DVVHWVµ  Id. at 557-58. In order to maintain the appearance, the Federal
Government would have to pay market value³but how to value assets that
have no reliable market value is not clear. Cf. id. at 558 (positing that the
Government must pay more than the fair market value of the troubled
assets). This problem is further exacerbated by the lack of transparency in
the packaging and pooling of the underlying assets. See id. at 557-58.
112. See Tarp Capital Purchase Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 62205-01 (Oct.
30, 2008) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30). Under the Program, the Treasury
Department will aim to fund the banking system by purchasing stock in
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´The case for doing something to prevent the next financial
PDUNHWPHOWGRZQLVFRPSHOOLQJ:KDWWKDW¶VRPHWKLQJ·VKRXOG
EH WKRXJK LV QRWµ113 The Federal Reserve and the Treasury
Department sensibly acted quickly to shore up confidence in
PDUNHWV DQG WR KHDG RII ORVVHV  ´+RZHYHU KLVWRU\ VXJJHVWV
institutions. $250 billion has been allocated for this program. See also Press
5HOHDVH 86 'HS·W RI WKH 7UHDVXU\ 7UHDVXU\ $QQRXQFHV 7$53 &DSLWDO
Purchase
Program
Description
(Oct.
14,
2008),
available
at
www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1207.htm.
On November 25, 2008, the
Federal Reserve unveiled two plans, totaling $800 billion, aimed at boosting
spending and limiting damage from the weakening economy. The first, titled
the Term Asset-Backed Securities /RDQ )DFLOLW\ ´7$/)µ  FUHDWHG D 
billion lending facility to spur purchases of securities backed by consumer
and small-business loans. See FED. RESERVE, TERM ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES
LOAN FACILITY (TALF) TERMS AND CONDITIONS 1 (2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/monetary2008112
5a1.pdf. The program makes loans to holders of certain asset-backed
securities collateralized by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and
loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration. Id. In the second
program, the Federal Reserve will buy up to $100 billion in direct debt issued
by Government-6SRQVRUHG(QWHUSULVHV ´*6(Vµ DQG makes a similar pledge
to buy up to $500 billion in mortgage-backed debt issued by the GSEs. See
Press Release, Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Announces it Will Initiate
a Program to Purchase the Direct Obligations of Housing-Related
Government-Sponsored Enterprises (Nov. 25, 2008), available at
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/200811256.htm.
The
Federal Reserve put into place several protections against losses, including
limiting the lending facility to securities that hold the highest investment
rating from two or more nationally recognized credit rating agencies. See
FED. RESERVE, supra, at 1-3. Also, investors must provide the Reserve with
collateral worth more than loans they receive from TALF, id. at 2-3, and
must set up special purpose vehicles that will be used to hold or sell
securities if borrowers default on the underlying credit exposures, see id. at 3.
On December 3, 2008, the Federal Reserve reported to Congress that it had
purchased $40 billion of stock in American International Group under the
Capital Purchase Program. See FED. RESERVE, PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO
SECTION 129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008:
UPDATE ON OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD
UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 7 (2008),
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129periodicupdate.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 3, 2009). As of December 2008, the Reserve had signed
agreements with 84 financial institutions, under the CPP, committing $165
billion.
See Capital Purchase Program, Transaction Report (2008),
www.financialstability.gov/docs/CPP/CPPTransaction%20ReportDec%209.pdf
(last visited Nov. 3, 2009) (listing the institutions purchased under the
program and the costs paid for each as of December 9, 2008). Nine of the
largest banks in the nation received the first $125 billion. See id. Citigroup
received $25 billion. Id.
113. Robert Hahn & Peter Passell, The Rush to Re-Regulate,
VOICE,
July
2008,
at
3,
available
at
ECONOMISTS·
http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss3/art5/ (folloZ´'RZQORDGµ 
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that tackling an ambitious agenda for reform in the midst of a
financial crisis is an invitation to bad regulation³regulation
whose costs exceed the benefits;; regulation that serves the
interests of politically connected insiders rather than those of
WKHSXEOLFµ114
Now that there has been much time and much
consideration of the flaws and interrelatedness of the markets
and the effects of the practices by industry participants,
regulatory and industry reforms can be thoughtfully conceived.
The focus should be on systemic damage. These reforms must
have at least three aims: first, to preserve homeownership;;
second, to protect the integrity of the markets;; and third, to
avoid the moral hazard.
A. Preserving Homeownership
Inasmuch as the financial crisis began with falling home
prices and fears sparked by rampant mortgage defaults, it
seems that the first step out of this crisis is to stem the rate of
foreclosures. Remaining TARP funds115 should be used to buy
up assets and then to refinance the mortgages underlying those
assets.116
Many different kinds of interventions have been proposed
and implemented. The proposals have included: requiring
refinancing of loans underlying the mortgages held by the
GSEs;;117 permitting states to refinance loans at risk of
114. Id.
115. See supra note 106.
116. However, because of the multilayer and split-up nature of
securitized mortgages, modification of individual loans may be difficult even
for creditors so inclined.
117. See, e.g., 3UHVV 5HOHDVH 86 'HS·W RI WKH 7UHDVXU\ Treasury
Interim Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability Neel Kashkari Remarks
on GSE, HOPE NOW Streamlined Loan Modification Program (Nov. 11,
2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1264.htm;; United
States Department of Housing and 8UEDQ 'HYHORSPHQW ´86'+8'µ  )DFW
Sheet: Hope for Homeowners to Provide Additional Mortgage Assistance to
Struggling
Homeowners,
http://www.hud.gov/hopeforhomeowners/pressfactsheet.cfm (last visited Aug.
14, 2009). Under the Hope for Homeowners program, the Federal Housing
Administration insures troubled loans if the lender first agrees to write off a
portion of the principal. USDHUD, supra. Eligible loans would include those
with loan-to-value ratios up to 96.5 percent for borrowers whose refinancing
mortgage payments represent no more than 31 percent of their monthly gross

25

32

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:7

foreclosure through issuance of federal tax-exempt mortgage
revenue bonds;;118 and creating a new federal corporation to
purchase distressed mortgages from investors and convert
them to 30-year fixed-rate mortgages.119
There have also been proposals for moratoria on
foreclosures. In early 2009, the legislatures of several states
introduced bills that would have imposed them.120
Additionally, similar legislation was also introduced in
Congress.121 There is much debate about the wisdom and

income, and whose total debt does not exceed 43 percent of their income. Id.
Lenders may also extend mortgage terms to 40 years in order to reduce
monthly payments.
Id.
Another proposal would have the Federal
*RYHUQPHQWVKDUHWKHFRVWRIUHGXFLQJDERUURZHU·VPRQWKO\SD\PHQWId. A
lender or servicer would initiate a loan modification and agree to reduce
SD\PHQWV WR SHUKDSV  SHUFHQW RI D ERUURZHU·V LQFRPH WKH *RYHUQPHQW
would then step in and subsidize a further reduction, to perhaps 31 percent.
Id. Previously, the FDIC announced a plan to refinance loans issued by
failed banks that it had taken over. See FDIC, Loan Modification Program
for
Distressed
Indymac
Mortgage
Loans,
www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/modification/indymac.html (last visited Nov. 1,
2009).
On March 4, 2009, Fannie Mae announced the Obama
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ·V SODQ WR KHOS SUHVHUYH KRPH RZQHUVKLS ´0DNLQJ +RPH
$IIRUGDEOHµ ZKLFK ZLOO KHOS UHILQDQFH PRUWJDJHV KHOd or guaranteed by
FannieMae.
See
Fannie
Mae,
Making
Home
Affordable,
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/mha/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 14, 2009).
118. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
289, § 1338, 122 Stat. 2654, 2712-23 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4568).
119. 7KLV ODVW SURSRVDO ZRXOG PLPLF WKH +RPH 2ZQHUV· /RDQ
&RUSRUDWLRQ ´+2/&µ  ZKLFK ZDV HVWDEOLVKHG WR SXUchase delinquent home
mortgages during the Great Depression. See Act of June 13, 1933, ch. 64, § 1,
48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-68 (2006)). The
HOLC is viewed as having been highly successful, and it achieved this
success at low taxpayer cost³there was only an initial $200 million
capitalization, and this was eventually repaid. David C. Wheelock, The
Federal Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons From the Great
Depression, 90 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. (PART I) 133, 144 (2008).
HOLC purchased about a million loans from their originators and then
refinanced them as long-term, fixed-rate, fully-amortized loans that were
payable in monthly installments. Id. at 146. Although it purchased only
delinquent loans, it ended up foreclosing on fewer than twenty percent of the
refinanced loans. Id.
120. See, e.g., H. 1510, 186th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2009);; H. 2233, 86th Leg.
Sess., 1st Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2009);; A. 8236A, 232nd Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009);; S.
4109B, 232nd Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009). See also David C. Wheelock, Changing
the Rules: State Mortgage Foreclosure Moratoria During the Great
Depression, 90 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 569, 570 (2008).
121. See S. 2734, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008). See also MURPHY, supra
note 23, at 1;; Wheelock, supra note 120, at 570.
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efficacy of moratoria.122 Opponents argue that foreclosure
moratoria make loans costlier³with higher interest rates in
order to compensate for the added risks associated with an
inability to foreclose³and more difficult to obtain³due to
OHQGHUV· UHVWULcting the supply of their loans.123 At the same
time, lenders benefit in the short run from moratoria as they
allow time for the development of programs to refinance
delinquent mortgages. Without moratoria, high foreclosure
rates reduce property values, prompting still more foreclosures,
leading to a downward spiral in property values, and thereby
hurting lenders and contributing to further reduction in
mortgage failures.124
Congress should amend the bankruptcy code and give
bankruptcy judges the power to modify the mortgages of
debtors in bankruptcy.125
B. Protecting the Integrity of the Markets
Banks are the essential engines of the economy. As the

122. Many lenders in the last year have imposed voluntary moratoria on
foreclosures. During the Great Depression, by one estimate, approximately
one-half of all urban home mortgages were delinquent, as of the beginning of
1934. See Wheelock, supra note 120, at 569. State and local governments
responded by changing state laws governing foreclosure. Id. at 570. These
PHDVXUHV LQFOXGHG HQKDQFHPHQWV RI ERUURZHUV· UHGHPSWLRQ ULJKWV DQG
limiting deficiency judgments. Id.
123. Id. at 580.
David Wheelock, Assistant Vice President and
Economist for the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, suggests that the states
ignored this reality, believing that unrestricted foreclosures would result in
many people becoming homeless simultaneously. See id. at 580. He further
suggests that these moratoria were also expedients to buy time while the
economy recovered. See id. at 580.
124. Id. at 581.
125. The current policy of not permitting a bankruptcy workout on a
PRUWJDJHVHFXUHGE\DSULPDU\UHVLGHQFHLV´LQWHQGHGWRHQFRXUDJHWKHIORZ
RI FDSLWDO LQWR WKH KRPH OHQGLQJ PDUNHWµ  $GDP - /HYLWLQ  -RVKXD
Goodman, The Effect of Bankruptcy Strip-Down on Mortgage Markets 4
(Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 1087816, 2008) (quoting
Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087816
(follow
´'RZQORDGµ   7KDW LV, by providing greater security to investors with the
recourse of foreclosure, it is possible for lenders to offer lower interest rates
on primary residences, thereby encouraging the expansion of homeownership
among borrowers who would otherwise be unable to afford payments based
on higher interest rates. Id.
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recent measures of the health of economy have revealed in the
last two years³such as through dismal reports on consumer
spending, unemployment, and exports³when banks became
dysfunctional, economic activity stopped. Wall Street is still
reeling and still contracting. Although some assets, such as
good quality corporate debt, seem cheap, investors are still
skittish. Instead, what we are experiencing is what Keynes
FDOOHG WKH ´SDUDGR[ RI WKULIWµ126 in which household savings
grow and the financial services industry sheds its debt, thereby
leading to a further reduction in spending³which means no
earnings for sellers of services and products, and in turn, that
people lose jobs. While the Federal Reserve seems committed
WR UHVFXLQJ ELJ LQYHVWPHQW EDQNV ´WRR FRPSOH[ WR IDLOµ127
correction of the turmoil in the markets calls for policies that
are well-orchestrated and coherent, so as to guide us forward,
and to avoid waste and future disruptions. One economist has
UHPDUNHG WKDW WR GDWH ´WKH JRYHUQPHQW KDG GRQH LW ZLWK DQ
extreme degree of inconsistency. You almost have to be trying
to do things in an incoherent and inconsistent way to end up
with the huge range of ways they have come up with to address
WKHVHSUREOHPVµ128
But is a complete rewriting of financial regulation in order,
or should finance be free to innovate? During the Great
'HSUHVVLRQ $PHULFD WULHG WR WDPH ILQDQFH·V PRVW GDQJHURXV
traits through heavy regulation aimed at safety.129 However
clear-sighted such a move seems now, it should not be followed
at this time without taking advantage of hindsight³that is, a
look at the circumstances of the Great Depression in
FRPSDULVRQ WR ZKDW LV RFFXUULQJ WRGD\  ´,Q  WKH 8QLWHG
States economy had shrunk by one-third in real terms since
1929.
Industrial production had fallen by 40 percent.
Unemployment had soared to 25 percent, from 3 percent in

126. See generally JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).
127. Hahn & Passell, supra note 113, at 1.
128. Television Interview by Fox Business Network with David
Swenson, Yale Univ. Chief Inv. Officer (Jan. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/business-leaders/yale-investment-
chief-sticking-tried-tested/ (follow the first video image).
129. See Fixing Finance, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REPORT) (London), Jan. 24,
2009, at 20, 21.
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µ130
In addition to the Reconstruction Finance
&RUSRUDWLRQ ´5)&µ EX\LQJXSVWRFNLQEDQNs³at a cost
RI  ELOOLRQ ZKLFK LV DERXW  ELOOLRQ LQWRGD\·V GROODUV³
the Roosevelt-era Congress also put into place a whole slate of
remedial measures, such as bank deposit insurance and
disclosure requirements for securities issuers.131
Other
measures were also enacted that aimed to raise prices by
reducing or controlling output.132 Congress did this through
initiatives such as the National Industrial Recovery Act,133
which had been championed by big businesses. The effects of
these measures and their restraint and retardation of
commerce were long-standing.134
If we agree that the fundamentals of the lending and
banking sectors are sound, that the crisis resulted from a
confluence of fortuitous or exogenous circumstances (i.e., a
huge availability of liquidity by foreign investors and sovereign
wealth funds, as well as by opportunistic conduct from a small
number of market participants), then a lightly regulated
finance industry will be in our best interest.
130. Steve Lohr, Something to Fear, After All, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009,
at B1. The day after his inauguration on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt
´GHFODUHG D QDWLRQDO EDQN KROLGD\ DQG VHW WKH )HGHUDO 5HVHUYH DQG WKH
Treasury to work on a phased program to sort good banks from bad ones,
provide financing and restore confidence in tKH EDQNLQJ V\VWHPµ  Id.
Measures were also carried out by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
´5)&µ HVWDEOLVKHGLQId. ´7KHDJHQF\PDGHORDQVWRWURXEOHGEDQNV
and seized and sold off distressed assets at others. After government
inspections, many small banks never reopened, with more than 4,000 closed
LQ µ  Id. Historians have speculated that had the government
intervened sooner, recovery would have been quicker. Id. As it stood, the
economy did not fully revive until a decade after the crash, in great measure
as a consequence of the military escalation for World War II. Id. Most
historians still recognize the need for massive government spending³´>E@\
1942, total government spending as a share of the economy rose to 52
percent, and peaked at nearly 70 percent in 1944, when unemployment fell to
SHUFHQWµId.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, § 1, 48
Stat. 195-211 (repealed 1935). The Act was later declared unconstitutional as
a violation of the Commerce Clause. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
134. Among other things, the Act exempted industries from antitrust
prosecution if they agreed to enter into collective bargaining agreements with
their workers, which significantly raised wages. As a consequence, the price
of goods and services increased at the same time that wages became inflated.

29

36

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:7

To address the immediate crisis and to provide confidence
in the future, we should resist calls to close the Federal
5HVHUYH·V ´GLVFRXQW ZLQGRZµ;; the federal regulations and
programs are a way to direct assistance to needy entities
without changing monetary policy, as well as a way to empower
the Reserve to move quickly toward a measure of price
stability. The Federal Reserve should, though, remain the
lender of last resort, and when it lends it should do so on a
´SHQDOW\ UDWH LH RQ JRRG EXW QRW SHUIHFW  FROODWHUDOµ135
Public money should come with strings attached;; if a rescue of
the next Bear Stearns is to occur, the beneficiaries of the rescue
should pay. Congress and the Treasury Department are only
now coming to this stance after learning of the billions of
dollars paid in bonuses to employees by banks who received
bailout monies136 DQG RI &LWLFRUS·V SODQ WR SXUFKDVH D QHZ
corporate jet, arguably enabled by the availability of bailout
monies.137 The proposed limits on the compensation levels of
executives of companies who are recipients of taxpayer funds
should be implemented in a meaningful matter, with few ways
for circumvention. The remainder of the TARP funds should
not be used to bail out the banks, since the facts have shown
that the interests of the banks do not necessarily coincide with
those of the nation³they did nothing to make credit available,
and instead used the public bailout funds to consolidate their
balance sheets and survive longer.138
135. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY
MARKET 197 (Hartley Whithers, ed., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1920) (1873).
136. See supra note 65.
137. Joe Nocera, ,W·V1RWWKH%RQXV0RQH\,W·VWKH3ULQFLSOH, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 2009, at B1.
138. ,QWKHVHFRQGJRYHUQPHQWDOEDLORXWRI&LWLJURXS´WD[SD\HUVSRXUHG
$60 billion . . . , increasing the value of Citigroup financial claims by only $44
ELOOLRQZLWKDQHWORVVRIELOOLRQµ/XLJL=LQJDOHVYes We Can, Secretary
Geithner, ECONOMISTS· VOICE, Feb. 2009, at 2, available at
http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/iss2/art3/ (follow ´'RZQORDGµ   7KLV PHDQW
WKDW´HDFKGROODUGRQDWHGWRILQDQFLDOLQYHVWRUVFRVWWRWD[SD\HUVZLWK
QRDGGLWLRQDOEHQHILWµId. Luigi Zingales, Professor of Entrepreneurship and
Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, believes this
UHVXOWZDV´HDVLO\SUHGLFWDEOHµVLQFHLWZDVKDUGO\WREHH[SHFWHGWKDWDEDQN
hobbling and newly rescued from disaster, would have the courage to thrust
itself right back into the volatile economy. Id. Instead, Professor Zingales
suggests that the sensible thing for the Government to have done was to have
´WDNHQRYHUWKHVHEDQNVDQGGLUHFWHGWKHIORZRIFUHGLWRU[to] have poured in
an amount of capital so large that even scared bankers would consider
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Congress should reassess the role of GSEs in the financial
markets and establish risk controls.139 Together, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac owned or guaranteed more than $4 trillion of
home mortgages, of which nearly half were outstanding.140
When mortgagors default, these GSEs are unable to pay their
investors their promised returns. To be sure, the secondary
market for mortgages is vital to achieving the national goal of
homeownership, but the risk of losses from these purchases
should be spread more widely in order to blunt the impact.
Standards or guidelines should be adopted for credit
ratings agencies.141 Some suggest that government regulations
are not necessary because the market will correct the problem
RI UDWLQJV LWVHOI DV ´RQFH-burned investors treat ratings
SURQRXQFHPHQWV PRUH VNHSWLFDOO\µ142 Indeed, regulation of
credit rating agencies may do more harm than good by
XQGHUPLQLQJ LQYHVWRUV· LQFHQWLYHV WR GR WKHLU KRPHZRUN Yet
transparency should be emphasized. Much of the losses
occurring in the housing finance markets can be attributed to a
lack of information on the part of investors and mortgagors,
either because the information was not offered or provided, or
because it was too difficult to obtain. While the recent
experiences by investors and mortgagors should prompt more
UHVWDUWLQJWKHOHQGLQJSURFHVVµId. at 3.
139. There has been a debate about whether an implicit guarantee by
WKH )HGHUDO *RYHUQPHQW RI WKH *6(V· GHEWV HQFRXUDJHG RU DW OHDVW
facilitated, excessive risk-taking. See generally David Reiss, The Federal
*RYHUQPHQW·V ,PSOLHG *XDUDQWHH RI )DQQLH 0DH DQG )UHGGLH 0DF·V
Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 46 GA. L. REV. 1019 (2008). If
WKHFXUUHQWVWDWHRIWKH*6(V·EDODQFHVKHHWVGRHVQRWVHWWOHWKHLVVXHWKHQLW
is doubtful that anything will. Indeed, that guarantee has become explicit.
140. See A Primer on the Secondary Mortgage Market, 2008 OFFICE FED.
HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, MORTGAGE MARKET NOTE pt. 3, at 2, available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/1242/MMNOTE083.pdf.
141. See generally POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 67. On December 3,
2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission voted to adopt rules designed
to bolster oversight of credit rating agencies. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
([FK &RPP·Q 6(& $SSURYHV 0HDVXUHV WR 6WUHQJWKHQ 2YHUVLJKW RI &UHGLW
Rating
Agencies
(Dec.
3,
2008),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-284.htm. The new rules aimed to
improve disclosure, reporting, and recordkeeping practices of the nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations in order to reduce conflicts of
interest at these entities and to promote competition within the industry. Id.
In particular, the new rules would require disclosure of the ratings history for
all issuer-paid ratings. Id.
142. Hahn & Passel, supra note 113, at 3.
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vigilance, transparency by the lenders and agents will achieve
important efficiency goals in financial markets, particularly
considering that the information needed to make wise decisions
changes rapidly in our complex markets.
Lenders should be required to adjust their capital cushions
to reflect their risks in falling markets. The task of measuring
such risks in a world in which every major lender depends on
every other major lender to honor financial contracts is truly
daunting. One must wonder whether more regulation here
would drive lenders from the high-risk credit on which cutting-
edge businesses depend.
C. Avoiding the Moral Hazard
Was it just shortsightedness that contributed to the
current market failure? Was it willfulness³or just greed?
Was it the larceny in the human heart? Who is to blame for all
the mispricing and poor results? Individual responsibility is
not absolute. Behavioral economists have demonstrated that
humans are powerfully and unwittingly influenced and co-
opted by prevailing ideas and assumptions.143 We are unable
to resist the enticement of something for free³such as
mortgage loans that are provided without documentation of
income, and which require no down-payments.
Shortsightedness can be responded to in some measure by
requiring more stringent underwriting standards by lenders,
greater disclosure to investors, increased transparency by
ratings agencies, and stricter and more prudent accounting by
the issuers. But how to respond to willfulness and greed?
Removing the opportunities for acting out on temptations for
ill-gotten gains, such as by mandating capital requirements
and banning the use of off-balance sheet vehicles, and
adherence to Basel Standards144 would be the first thoughts.

143. See generally John Gowdy & Irmi Seidl, Economic Man and Selfish
Genes: The Implications of Group Selection For Economic Valuation and
Policy, 33 J. SOCIO-ECON. 343 (2004).
144. The Basel Committee is a consortium of international banking
representatives who analyze and provide recommendations and guidelines on
a wide variety of financial issues. See %DQNIRU,QW·O6HWWOHPHQWV+LVWory of
the
Basel
Committee
and
Its
Membership,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2009).
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But, if we operate on the premise that evil lurks within us all,
then sterner measures may be in order, such as stiff civil and
criminal penalties for violating accounting standards, for
nondisclosure, and for misrepresentations.
In the meantime, how can newly-rescued borrowers be
convinced to be more watchful in the future? How can others
be made to heed the rashness of those who faced ruin before?
How can the experiences of Long-Term Capital Management145
become instructive so as to prompt an attitude of prudence, as
opposed to one that is cavalier, on the belief that their unsound
loans would be made good by the Federal Government?
Perhaps the key to avoiding or minimizing the moral hazard is
to restrict intervention to truly exceptional circumstances.
Assistance should perhaps be limited to aiding those at risk of
losing their homes, but it should not enable overreaching
lenders to avoid the loss of their vacation homes.146 But
separating out the bad from the stupid is no easy task. FDIC
&KDLUPDQ 6KHLOD %DLU EHOLHYHV WKDW D ´FRPSOH[ LQWHUSOD\ RI
risky behavior by lenders, borrowers, and investors led to the
FXUUHQWILQDQFLDOVWRUPµ147 ,QIDFWVKHVWDWHGWKDW´WKHOHQGLQJ
practices that are causing problems today were driven by

145. In 1998, the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management was on
the brink of collapse, standing to lose $100 billion. See FERGUSON, supra note
9, at 323-27. The Fund had been managed by finance quants who had made
many unsound, esoteric bets, including investments in interest-rate
derivatives. Id. at 323-  5XVVLD·V LQDELOLW\ WR SD\ LWV GHEWV VHQW JOREDO
markets into turmoil and put the fund, which was saddled with high-leverage
and off-balance sheet obligations, near collapse. See id. at 328. Because the
fund owed large sums to banks and other financial institutions, its collapse
could have meant ruin for these investors. See id. at 327. The Federal
Reserve thus intervened by putting together a consortium of companies to
buy it out and cover its debts. Id. While all the shareholders of the fund
were wiped out, the creditors were protected. Ten years later, Lehman
Brothers was allowed to fail by the Federal Reserve. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text. Its debts have been estimated to exceed $600 billion. See
supra note 93.
146. Richard S. Fuld, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
Lehman Brothers, who tried to blame everyone else for the market collapse,
recently sold his $13 million mansion in Florida to his wife for $10.00. Clyde
Haberman, Imparting Some Shame to Those Who Trade in Greed, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at A25.
147. Sheila Bair, Chairman, FDIC, Remarks Before the Consumer
Federation
of
America
(Dec.
4,
2008),
available
at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2008/chairman/spdec0408_2
.html.
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desire for market share and revenue growth . . . pure and
VLPSOHµ148
V. Conclusion
The fault lies not in securitization, but in ourselves³in our
abuses, carelessness, and cupidity.
While securitization
achieves definite efficient goals³such as dividing up and
VSUHDGLQJ ULVN VXLWDEOH WR LQYHVWRUV· YDU\LQJ REMHFWLYHs and
levels of risk adversity, and by reducing the equity capital
needed by intermediaries to absorb the risk of the assets being
intermediated³it remains to consider whether the risks
created by a process that operates without limits and
transparency are greater than the risks it purports to allocate
in the first place.

148. Id.
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